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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable | SpringerLink
Source: link.springer.com
Article summary:
1. Moral realism has been criticized for its first-order moral commitments, which some argue are objectionable. Realists are seen as committed to conditionals that suggest nothing is wrong if there are no non-natural facts, and that dog pain is not intrinsically bad if it does not share non-natural properties with human pain.
2. The objection fails because it assumes a narrow epistemological perspective and ignores the distinction between metaphysical and normative grounding relations. Realists can accept conditionals like (C1) and (C2) without endorsing morally objectionable views.
3. Realists can respond to metaphysical evidence about the non-existence of non-natural properties by rejecting the consequents of their conditionals or accepting them as junk knowledge. This response is similar to how we deal with other scientific or philosophical claims that conflict with our beliefs.
Article analysis:
该文章主要探讨了道德现实主义是否具有道德上的问题。作者认为，最近一些批评道德现实主义的观点都没有成功地证明道德现实主义存在道德问题。然而，该文章存在以下几个问题：
首先，作者似乎忽略了一些可能的反驳观点。例如，对于条件(C1)，一些人可能会认为“错误”是一个相对概念，因此即使不存在非自然事实，我们仍然可以说某些事情是错误的。同样地，对于条件(C2)，一些人可能会认为狗疼痛和人类疼痛之间存在共同点，并且这种共同点并不需要非自然属性来解释。
其次，作者似乎没有考虑到其他形式的道德现实主义批评。例如，一些人可能会认为道德现实主义过于抽象和理论化，并且无法解释我们在日常生活中如何做出道德决策。
此外，该文章似乎缺乏平衡性和客观性。作者只关注了支持道德现实主义的论据，并没有探讨反对它的论据或者其他形式的伦理学理论。
最后，在某些方面，该文章似乎过于宣传性质。作者试图证明道德现实主义没有道德问题，但是他的论据似乎只是在支持自己的观点，而没有真正探讨其他可能的观点或者反驳。