1. The capacity of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) under arbitrary collusion and eavesdropping patterns for replicated databases is studied.
2. The capacity remains unchanged when exchanging the colluding and eavesdropping patterns.
3. Upper and lower bounds on the capacity are given, with a lower bound described by an integer linear programming problem.
The article is generally reliable and trustworthy, as it provides a detailed analysis of the capacity of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) under arbitrary collusion and eavesdropping patterns for replicated databases. The authors provide evidence to support their claims, such as citing previous research in the field, providing mathematical proofs for their results, and providing upper and lower bounds on the capacity with a solution to an integer linear programming problem.
The article does not appear to be biased or one-sided in its reporting, as it presents both sides of the argument equally. It also does not appear to contain any promotional content or partiality towards any particular viewpoint or opinion. Furthermore, all possible risks associated with SPIR are noted in the article, such as privacy leaks from malicious servers monitoring user queries or security breaches of the database itself.
The only potential issue with this article is that some counterarguments may have been unexplored or missing points of consideration may have been overlooked. However, this does not detract from the overall reliability and trustworthiness of the article itself.