1. The Airbus bribery scandal involved institutionalized payment of bribes to secure contracts, which was part of the firm's organizing strategy.
2. Organizing practices at Airbus actively encouraged employees to break bribery compliance policies and engage in illegal activities.
3. The study uses collective myopia as a lens to explore how illegitimate praxis, ingrained dispositions, and activities of organizational members combine to fuel and perpetuate bribery in organizing.
The article "The Airbus bribery scandal: A collective myopia perspective" provides a comprehensive analysis of the infamous Airbus bribery scandal, exploring how the executives of the global aircraft manufacturer institutionalized the payment of bribes to secure contracts. The authors draw on collective myopia as a lens to explain how illegitimate praxis, ingrained dispositions, and activities of organizational members combine to fuel and perpetuate bribery in organizing.
Overall, the article presents a well-researched and insightful analysis of the Airbus bribery scandal. The authors provide a detailed account of how Airbus's organizing practices actively encouraged employees to break its own bribery compliance policies, which they employed as smokescreens to cover their illegal activities. They also develop a collective myopic-bribery framework outlining how the collective myopia in organizing drove the bribery activities at Airbus.
However, there are some potential biases and missing points of consideration in this article. Firstly, while the authors acknowledge that executive hubris, situational stimuli, and personal ambitions may facilitate bribery in organizing, they focus primarily on organizational routines and practices. This narrow focus may overlook other important factors that contribute to corruption in organizations.
Secondly, while the authors provide evidence for their claims from publicly available court-approved documents, company websites and internal emails, and newspaper articles on the scandal, they do not explore counterarguments or alternative perspectives. This lack of exploration may limit the article's credibility and objectivity.
Thirdly, while the authors highlight the implications of their findings for theory and practice, they do not discuss possible risks associated with their proposed framework or potential limitations. This omission may weaken their argument and limit its applicability.
In conclusion, while this article provides valuable insights into how organizational routines and practices can institutionalize corruption in organizations like Airbus SE., it is important to consider other factors that contribute to corruption in organizations. Additionally, further research is needed to explore potential risks associated with using a collective myopic-bribery framework to understand corruption in organizations.