1. This study examines whether firms and executives with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying incur lower costs from the enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
2. The study finds that politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC.
3. Contributions to politicians in a strong position to put pressure on the SEC, as well as amounts paid to lobbyists with prior employment links to the SEC, and amounts spent on lobbying the SEC directly, are more effective than other lobbying expenditures at reducing enforcement costs faced by firms.
This article is generally reliable and trustworthy, as it provides evidence for its claims through empirical research. The author has conducted a thorough analysis of data from various sources, including contributions to politicians, lobbying expenditures, and prior employment links to the SEC. Furthermore, the author has provided detailed explanations of their methodology and results.
However, there are some potential biases that should be noted. First, the article does not explore counterarguments or present both sides equally; instead it focuses solely on how political connections can reduce enforcement costs for firms. Second, while the author acknowledges that there may be other factors influencing enforcement decisions besides political connections (e.g., firm size or visibility), these factors are not discussed in detail in this article. Finally, while this article provides evidence for its claims through empirical research, it does not provide any evidence for potential risks associated with using political connections to influence enforcement decisions.