1. Supply chain disruptions, such as natural disasters or pandemics, are an inherent part of the global context and can have a serious impact on businesses.
2. Resilience analytics is essential for measuring a supply chain's ability to prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to disruptions.
3. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for robust resilience analytics across broad sectors and networks in order to avoid catastrophic failure.
The article “Trends and applications of resilience analytics in supply chain modeling: systematic literature review in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic” provides an overview of the current state of resilience analytics in supply chain modeling with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic. The article is well written and provides a comprehensive overview of the topic, including definitions of resilience, examples of disruptions that require resilience, and an analysis of existing literature on epidemics and pandemics as systemic threats to global supply chains.
The article is generally reliable and trustworthy; however, there are some potential biases that should be noted. For example, while the authors provide examples from both natural disasters (e.g., wildfires in Australia) and human-caused events (e.g., Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant explosion), they do not discuss any potential political implications or motivations behind these events which could lead to bias in their analysis. Additionally, while they discuss government oversight as one viable option for ensuring essential supply chains do not fail during threats such as pandemics, they do not explore any potential drawbacks or risks associated with this approach which could lead to partiality in their conclusions.
In terms of unsupported claims or missing points of consideration, there are some areas where more evidence could be provided or further exploration could be done. For instance, when discussing how one supply chain’s product might be another supply chain’s strategy to absorb a disruption and prevent further network disruption (e.g., DHL International Ltd.), more evidence could be provided regarding how this strategy was successful during past epidemics/pandemics or what other strategies have been used successfully by other companies/supply chains during similar events. Additionally, while the authors provide an overview of existing literature reviews on supply chain resilience published between 2017-2019, they do not explore any potential gaps in these reviews which could lead to missing evidence for their claims made throughout the article.
In conclusion, overall this