1. This article presents a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers, where firms choose levels of cost-reducing innovation before competing for each other's R&D-employees.
2. The approach is applied to the debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives, showing that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition.
3. For a wide range of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation incentives than quantity competition.
The article is written in an objective and unbiased manner, presenting both sides of the argument equally and providing evidence for its claims. The authors provide a clear explanation of their approach and how it applies to the debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives. They also provide evidence from their research that supports their conclusions, such as showing that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, they note potential risks associated with their approach, such as possible unintended consequences or unforeseen implications. In conclusion, this article is reliable and trustworthy due to its balanced presentation of both sides of the argument and its use of evidence to support its claims.