1. Climate change is a global challenge that requires coordinated efforts from numerous international actors.
2. This paper examines the possibility of a tolerance premium, which is a transfer payment in exchange for accepting and complying with an agreement.
3. The study shows that the optimal tolerance premium depends on the value of the prize to the transferee and can result in a stalling of the conflict.
The article provides an interesting perspective on how to design global climate agreements without relying on a global government. The authors present their argument using Dixit’s conflict model, which is an established economic theory. However, there are some potential biases and unsupported claims in the article that should be noted.
First, the authors do not provide any evidence for their claim that collective decision making can be self-enforced without a higher authority. This claim could be supported by citing research or studies that have been conducted on this topic, but none are provided in this article.
Second, while the authors discuss how to incentivize compliance with climate agreements through transfer payments, they do not explore any potential risks associated with this approach or consider any counterarguments to it. For example, it is possible that such payments could lead to corruption or other unintended consequences if not properly monitored and regulated.
Finally, while the authors provide some insight into how transfer payments could be used as incentives for compliance with climate agreements, they do not discuss any other potential solutions or approaches to this problem. This lack of exploration of alternative solutions makes it difficult to assess whether transfer payments are truly the best option for incentivizing compliance with climate agreements or if there may be better alternatives available.