1. This article discusses the optimal entry decision of unemployment insurance under partial information.
2. It examines the design of UI contracts and how they can help cushion the financial blow of job loss.
3. It introduces an auxiliary non-degenerate optimal stopping problem to solve the two-dimensional optimal stopping problem under incomplete information.
The article is written in a clear and concise manner, making it easy to understand for readers with some knowledge of economics and finance. The authors provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on UI contracts, as well as an introduction to their proposed model for solving the two-dimensional optimal stopping problem under incomplete information. The authors also provide a detailed analysis of their model, including a proof of monotonicity and continuity of the free boundary to the auxiliary problem, as well as numerical results from their model.
The article is generally reliable and trustworthy, although there are some potential biases that should be noted. For example, the authors focus primarily on UI contracts funded by governments or insurance companies, which may lead to a bias towards these types of contracts over other types of UI products available in different countries. Additionally, while the authors do discuss potential risks associated with their proposed model, they do not explore any counterarguments or present both sides equally when discussing these risks. Finally, there is no mention of any promotional content in this article; however, it should be noted that this could be present in other articles related to this topic.