Full Picture

Extension usage examples:

Here's how our browser extension sees the article:
May be slightly imbalanced

Article summary:

1. The Chinese government often uses R&D subsidies as a key policy tool to incentivize companies to engage in independent innovation.

2. This article establishes a dynamic asymmetric information game model between the enterprise and the R&D subsidy policy maker, in order to illustrate the strategic behavior of enterprises in obtaining R&D subsidies and the incentive effect of R&D subsidies.

3. The study found that when there is asymmetry of information between the two parties and the price of specialized human capital for original innovation is too low, original innovation subsidies will have a "reverse" incentive effect.

Article analysis:

The article is generally reliable and trustworthy, as it provides an extensive analysis of how R&D subsidies can be used to incentivize independent innovation by Chinese companies. The article also provides evidence for its claims, such as establishing a dynamic asymmetric information game model between the enterprise and the R&D subsidy policy maker, which helps illustrate the strategic behavior of enterprises in obtaining R&D subsidies and their incentive effects. Furthermore, it provides potential solutions to improve efficiency of government R&D subsidies through raising prices for specialized human capital for original innovation.

However, there are some potential biases that should be noted. For example, while the article does provide evidence for its claims, it does not explore any counterarguments or present both sides equally. Additionally, while it does provide potential solutions to improve efficiency of government R&D subsidies, it does not discuss any possible risks associated with these solutions or consider other alternatives that could be explored.