1. In 1991, Argentina implemented the Convertibility Plan, which pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a one-to-one rate of exchange.
2. The fixed exchange rate stabilized prices and increased foreign investment, but ultimately failed to reduce devaluation risk and sovereign risk.
3. In 2002, Argentina was unable to repay its external debts and defaulted on its loans, leading to economic contraction, rising unemployment, and social unrest.
The article is generally reliable in terms of accuracy and trustworthiness. It provides a comprehensive overview of the events leading up to the Argentina crisis in 2002, including details about the Convertibility Plan implemented in 1991 and its effects on inflation and foreign investment. The article also mentions the currency-growth-debt trap that led to the crisis in 2002 as well as its consequences for Argentina's economy and society.
However, there are some potential biases present in the article that should be noted. For example, it does not explore any counterarguments or alternative perspectives on why or how the crisis occurred; instead it focuses solely on one explanation (the Convertibility Plan). Additionally, it does not mention any possible risks associated with implementing such a plan or any other potential causes of the crisis beyond what is mentioned in the article. Furthermore, it does not provide any evidence for some of its claims (e.g., that foreign investment increased due to the fixed exchange rate). Finally, it does not present both sides of an argument equally; instead it presents only one perspective on why/how the crisis occurred without exploring other possibilities or counterarguments.