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The metaphysical neutrality of cognitive science | SpringerLink
Source: link.springer.com
Article summary:
1. Cognitive science does not necessarily imply physicalism or any other metaphysical position.
2. Supervenience relations can be interpreted in physicalist, idealist, and dualist terms.
3. Data from cognitive science may end up supporting some positions on the mind-body problem more than others.
Article analysis:
The article is generally reliable and trustworthy, as it provides a well-reasoned argument for its conclusion that cognitive science has no implications for the mind-body problem. The author acknowledges that data from cognitive science may end up supporting some positions on the mind-body problem more than others, but does not provide any evidence to support this claim. Additionally, the article does not explore any counterarguments to its conclusion or present both sides of the argument equally. Furthermore, there is a lack of discussion about potential risks associated with interpreting data from cognitive science in different ways. In general, the article is well written and provides a clear argument for its conclusion; however, it could benefit from further exploration of counterarguments and potential risks associated with interpreting data from cognitive science differently.
Topics for further research:
Mind-body problem counterarguments
Risks of interpreting cognitive science data
Implications of cognitive science for the mind-body problem
Philosophical implications of cognitive science
Cognitive science and the mind-body dualism debate
Cognitive science and the mind-body problem: a critical review